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What is the point of moratoria in international environmental regimes? A comparative analysis of the EU moratorium on GM products and the IWC moratorium on 
commercial whaling 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper is an examination of the place of moratoria in international environmental regimes (IERs). At first sight, moratoria are simply temporary bans on activities which 
may be harmful, until some means can be arrived at to deal with them on a permanent basis. However, very little research has been conducted into the operation of moratoria, 
and the purpose of this paper is twofold: first to develop a conceptual framework for studying their rationale and effectiveness; and second to apply that framework in a 
comparative analysis of two high profile environmental moratoria - the European Union (EU)’s moratorium on genetically modified (GM) products and the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC)’s moratorium on commercial whaling. The conceptual framework, which was arrived at by a study of 40 international moratoria, produced a 
typology classifying them according to their subject matter, trigger, reach, purpose, status, duration, output, outcome, and impact. This typology was applied to the EU and 
IWC moratoria in order to compare the way in which they originated, were used, and achieved their goals. The result of this analysis is a deeper understanding of the role of 
moratoria in international environmental regimes: far from being mere administrative mechanisms for temporarily postponing activities pending further scientific research, 
moratoria are shown to be highly political instruments which play complex roles in IERs.  
 
Introduction 
 
A moratorium is a temporary prohibition on some behaviour, ostensibly imposed in order to allow further investigation to take place before a resumption of that behaviour 
can be considered. Moratoria are one of the ‘quiet’ means of international diplomacy and are part of a wide repertoire of policy options. They have been used in many issue 
areas, including the environmental arena, and have sometimes had very important consequences – indeed they are often known largely by their repercussions (Lieberman and 
Gray, 2006, p. 596). For example, they can block or paralyse intricately agreed rules and regulations established in international environmental regimes (IERs) and 
institutions. They can change the nature of an IER fundamentally (in some cases, environmental moratoria have been imposed upon agreements or regimes not previously 
considered environmental in nature, thus changing the aims and objectives of the commitment made – perhaps to an irreversible extent). They can induce states and other 
actors to alter their behaviour and they can undermine a state’s commitment to the IER. Thus, moratoria are powerful instruments in environmental international relations, yet 
no systematic analysis has been carried out into their institutional implications. While there is a considerable literature on some specific moratoria, such as the IWC’s 
moratorium on commercial whaling, moratoria in general have not been studied. Accordingly, there is no typology which sets out the origins of a moratorium, the forms that 
it might take, the effects that it has, its likely duration and the processes for its termination. Given the potential importance of moratoria and the proliferation of international 
commitments in recent decades, specifically international environmental agreements, a conceptual analysis of their operation is timely.  
 
 In section 2, a typology is set out in which moratoria are classified according to their subject matter, trigger, reach, purpose, status, duration, output, outcome, and impact. 
Section 3 makes use of this typology to present a comparative analysis of two of the most well-known contemporary moratoria – the EU moratorium on GM products, and 
the IWC moratorium on commercial whaling. Section 4 discusses what this comparative analysis tells us of the role of moratoria in IERs. Section 5 concludes the paper by 
summarising its findings and their implications. 
 
Typology of moratoria 
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The literal meaning of the term ‘moratorium’ is a temporary prohibition of an activity. Its etymological origin lies in the Latin term, morari, to delay, and it is commonly 
employed to give a formal coping to a delaying process. For our purposes, the meaning attached to the term moratorium is the suspension of an activity or practice through 
governmental or intergovernmental policy decision-making. A gap exists in the regime analysis literature on the nature and role of moratoria. Although particular moratoria 
are frequently discussed in analyses of environmental regimes, there has been no systematic analysis of moratoria in general. This study seeks to fill this gap by constructing a 
typology which classifies moratoria according to nine factors – subject matter; trigger; reach; purpose; status; duration; output; outcome; and impact. These factors were 
chosen as a result of a study of 40 moratoria, 26 of which were environmental (the remaining 14 were medical, legal, or military); and 30 were international (the remaining 10 
were either national or sub-national).    
 
Although moratoria vary greatly, our research revealed three common features. First, moratoria are problem-centred. Second, moratoria are agreements: they may be the 
product of consensual, majority or unilateral agreement, but they must comprise an agreed decision, made within, or permitted by, the institutional structures, formal or 
informal. Third, moratoria are designed to achieve some effect – such as a change in the IER’s rules; a change in the IER member parties’ behaviour; or a change in human 
impact on the natural environment; or sometimes all three. Accordingly, we split our typology into three broad categories: the first analyses the problem addressed by the 
moratorium; the second analyses the agreement put in place; and the third analyses the effects of the moratorium. On the first issue, the problem identified, we have specified 
three important aspects for identification and analysis – subject matter; trigger; and reach. The second issue, agreement, also has three important aspects – purpose; status; 
and duration. On the third issue, the effects of the moratorium, following Miles et al. (2002)’s regime effectiveness model we concentrate on outputs (mechanisms put in 
place); outcomes (behavioural changes made by actors); and impacts (actual environmental change). While moratoria may have other features, these nine criteria provide a 
clear basis for a framework for the examination of moratoria.  
 
The problem addressed by the moratorium 
 
The subject matter of most moratoria lies in one or other of four broad categories – environmental, legal, medical and military. Our focus is on environmental moratoria, 
which requires one of the following stimuli or triggers to come into being; new technology which raises environmental and health concerns; new research findings of 
environmental degradation; human rights concerns; or security issues. We note that ‘subject matter’ and ‘trigger’ are not synonymous: for example, the Irish government’s 
moratorium on grid connections for wind farms is environmental in terms of subject matter, but the trigger was energy security worries (O’Gallachoir et al., 2007). The reach 
of the problem is likely to affect the range of the moratorium that is put in place. We therefore also categorise the problem behind the moratorium in terms of its reach – 
sectoral, subnational, national, transnational, or global. We note that in some cases, for example, the death penalty moratoria, although the issue is discussed internationally 
and nationally, the moratoria put in place are often sub-national rather than international or national. 
 
The agreement constituting the moratorium 
 
There are many different reasons why a moratorium is instigated, but they fall into two broad categories – conservative and radical. The conservative purpose, adopting 
terminology used by McKaskle (2003, p. 279), is ‘Preserving the status quo during the creation and implementation of a comprehensive plan’. A moratorium which is 
established to preserve the status quo may take the form of a holding operation pending further research (scientific, socio-economic, or public opinion), or administrative 
reorganisation to provide regime change or new institutional machinery. It can also give time for political negotiations to resolve the issue or to kick an awkward problem 
into the long grass for future politicians. It may be the only way to achieve political consensus, through agreement on the lowest common denominator. The radical reason is 
to alter the status quo, to facilitate change. Radical moratoria may be used to allow time for the regeneration of an environment; or to change harmful economic or political 
 3 
practices; or to buy time during which those whom are likely to be convinced can be reassured, while those opposed are gradually pushed aside since the fears that they have 
expressed either do not materialise or are accommodated. In short, the radical moratorium serves as an interim period in the process of change to ease the pain of those 
wedded to the status quo.  
 
As for their status, in legal terms, moratoria are either de facto or de jure. A de facto moratorium is one that simply exists, whether with legal authority or not – that is, it is 
generally accepted or informally agreed without any legal decision being necessary. For example, the EU’s GM moratorium ‘was not an official policy adopted by the EU, 
but a default outcome of deadlock in the Regulatory Committee and the Council of Environment Ministers which the Commission chose not to resolve’ (Lieberman and 
Gray, 2006, p. 606). Similarly, the 30 year-old moratorium on offshore oil and gas exploration in British Columbia was not a ‘legal or formal moratorium’ but rather a ‘policy 
and procedural direction by both the provincial and federal governments’ (ENS, 2002). However, compliance with a de facto moratorium is not always entirely a voluntary 
matter. For example, although the EU’s moratorium on the authorisation of GM crops and food was a de facto moratorium in that no legal documents exist to chart its 
existence, it was not a voluntary moratorium because, due to the GMO approval mechanism and weighted majority voting procedures in the EU, the moratorium was imposed 
on all Member States. By contrast, a de jure moratorium is by definition a legally-determined agreement, compliance with which is legally obligatory. 
 
In some cases, it is easy to trace the duration of a moratorium, because the date of agreement can be found and the end point is decided before its instigation. For example, the 
CITES moratorium on the export of black caviar began in 2006 and ended in 2007 with the establishment of new export licensing rules (CITES, 2007), while the EU’s 1990 
moratorium on bovine growth hormone was formally replaced, following scientific research, by a full ban in 1999 (Macmillan, 2003, p. 193). However, in other cases – the 
EU’s GMO moratorium provides a good example – it is difficult to define an end point to the moratorium (Lieberman and Gray, 2006, p. 603); while the IWC’s moratorium 
on commercial whaling seems to have developed a life of its own. Indeed, despite their ad interim conceptual meaning, moratoria often become permanent: the EU’s GMO 
approval blockage is arguably still in force; the IWC’s whaling ban still stands; the Canadian oil and gas moratorium continues to prevent offshore development; and the Irish 
Sea Cod Recovery Programme, instigated in 2000 for a six-month period, remains in place today. We can thus classify the duration of a moratorium as either indefinite, 
drifting on to become part of the institutional furniture; finite but not fixed term; fixed term after which it  will be reviewed; or fixed term after which it  will automatically 
end, having served its  function. Moreover, when (and if) a moratorium does end, the regime may either revert to its original rationale, or have that rationale permanently 
modified. 
 
The effects of the moratorium 
 
When considering the effects of a moratorium, we are looking first at the outputs – i.e., at the rules and regulations that the moratorium introduced. Were they wholly 
restrictive – forbidding a particular conduct – or did they provide positive incentives for approved conduct? Did they allow parties to opt out of compliance? Were they 
endorsed by the whole regime through a consensus – or carried only by majority vote thereby masking dissensus? Second, we look at the outcomes – i.e., whether the 
moratorium succeeded in controlling or changing the behaviour of the relevant actors, such as states and multinational companies. If so, has compliance occurred because of 
fear of sanctions; or through economic incentives; or from moral conviction; or as a result of domestic political pressures? Has the moratorium changed the nature of the 
international regime it inhabits? For example, has it given the regime political salience for the first time? Or has it altered the IER’s whole rationale (as in the case of the IWC 
moratorium on commercial whaling) to the point of threatening its continued existence by stretching the differences between the parties to breaking point? Third, we look at 
the impact – i.e., whether the moratorium has had a beneficial impact on the natural environment, thereby solving the problem it was created to address. This last question is 
in two parts: first, has there been an improvement in the relevant bio-physical environment? Second, if so, can we attribute that improvement to the moratorium, or are there 
other factors that could account for it?  
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Comparative analysis of two moratoria – EU and IWC 
 
In this section, we make use of the above typology to analyse two of the most discussed (but not compared) moratoria in international environmental politics: the EU’s 
moratorium on the authorisation of GM crops and foods, and the IWC’s moratorium on commercial whaling.  
 
The EU’s moratorium on GM products  
 
In 1999, following a decision to revise the Directives governing the Environmental Release (90/220) and the Contained Use (90/219) of genetically modified organisms, two 
declarations were issued by the Member States of the EU suggesting that authorisations of new GM products would be blocked until new, more stringent, legislation could be 
put in place. The first Declaration 
i
 was signed by the Danish, Greek, French, Italian and Luxembourg delegations; and the second Declaration 
ii
, which now seems to be the 
longer-lasting one due to its specification that evidence of non-harm be found before authorisations recommence, was signed by the Austrian, Belgian, Finnish, German, 
Netherlands, Spanish and Swedish delegations (Marris, 2000). All Member States except the UK, Ireland and Portugal signed one or other. This meant that the Member 
States could paralyse the qualified majority voting system used in the Regulatory Committee and the Council of Ministers by applying a blocking minority to prevent all new 
authorisations proceeding through the approval process. Although no new rules or regulations were adopted in 1999, this state of paralysis became known as a moratorium 
and despite the lack of a formal rule, authorisations for cultivation of GMOs at the EU level ceased. In this respect the moratorium was fully restrictive in that no new GMOs 
could be approved or used by individual Member States. Nonetheless, this change of direction was considered a moratorium rather than an outright change of policy as the 
Declarations suggested that this blockage would be lifted when the revised Directive on Environmental Release was adopted.   
 
The subject matter of this moratorium was environmental. Although it appeared to be fuelled by well-publicised media stories about the alleged threats to human health and 
the natural environment posed by genetically modified food (‘frankenfoods’) and crops (‘superweeds’), at its root was the path dependent institutional structure of the EU 
which framed the GMO issue as environmental in the late 1980s when the drafting of the original Environmental Release Directive (90/220) was charged to DG XI 
(Environment). Although other DGs (Agriculture, Research, Internal Market and Industrial Affairs) were involved in early discussions regarding the regulation of GMOs, DG 
Environment took control of the drafting of the Directives and became chef de file for all environmental release authorisations (Patterson, 1997). Cantley (1995, p. 670) 
summarises the early (1980s) power struggle as a victory for ‘popular fears, political self interest and bureaucratic opportunism’ over ‘the voices of scientific protest’; while 
Patterson (1997, p. 30) suggests that DGXI had the greatest input due to a lower workload than the other interested DGs. While the reasons for the environmental framing 
may be contested, it is clear that charging DG Environment with both the drafting of the Directive and the task of chef de file allowed the moratorium to emerge: crucially, all 
authorisation proposals had to proceed through the Council of Environment Ministers, where the moratorium garnered more support than it might have done in other 
configurations of the Council.    
 
However,  despite the early environmental framing of the issue, and the largely negative public opinion in the EU about GM products, the advisory body charged with 
providing scientific advice on all GMO applications – EFSA (European Food Standards Agency) – declared consistently that the technology was safe, recommending the 
authorisation of the majority of GMO proposals. This meant that by the late 1990s as public opinion began to intensify against the technology, the path dependent regulatory 
system and the EU’s advisory committee were coming from completely different angles. Institutionally, the EU presented two different faces on GMOs: the more cautious 
‘environmental’ face of the Council of Environment Ministers, DG Environment and the European Parliament; and the more positive ‘science based’ face of EFSA. In 1999, 
concerns among Member States regarding the use of agricultural biotechnology had increased, and several suggested that Directive 90/220 lacked the necessary stringency to 
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regulate the technology. This triggered the decision temporarily to halt new authorisations of GM products, thereby imposing a moratorium to bridge “a period of [regulatory] 
uncertainty” between the drafting and instigation of a new framework of legislation (Lieberman and Gray, 2008a, p. 398) for GM product authorisation, traceability and 
labelling.  
 
The range of actors involved in forming and maintaining the GMO moratorium was varied, including the Member States (in the Council of Ministers and Regulatory 
Committees) and the EU’s Executive (DG Environment). However, it was also limited; political actors implemented and maintained the moratorium while the EU’s scientific 
advisors’ positive recommendations on the products of agricultural biotechnology were ignored. And, once in place, the reach of the moratorium was wide; all Member States 
of the EU were party to its outputs, outcomes and impacts. Moreover, its repercussions were felt globally: because of the non-authorisation of GM crops and foods, the USA 
has lost much of the European market for agricultural seeds, food and animal feed; and several African countries have refused food aid from the USA fearing the introduction 
of biotechnology into their environment.  
 
Using McKaskle’s terminology (2003), we class the purpose of this GM moratorium as conservative: it was instigated to preserve the status quo. Ostensibly, the EU upheld 
the moratorium on the authorisation of new GM crops and foods while further scientific and political research could be carried out on the effects of GM crops on the 
environment and the effect of GM foods on human health. However, it may also be that the moratorium was instigated and maintained to delay decision making on the GMO 
issue for political reasons, or inter-institutional buck passing. As Cantley (2005) commented, ‘it suits the member states quite well for the heat to be taken by the 
Commission. Then they can blame Brussels for it, rather than being seen as having taken the decision themselves. That is what Brussels is for, a scapegoat’. However, the 
GM moratorium did not signify a radical departure from the EU’s overall environmental mission, still less threaten its viability – even in the face of the WTO challenge. 
Rather it was designed to clarify and consolidate the Member States’ position on GM products which was that, until the adoption of ‘full draft rules ensuring labelling and 
traceability of GMOs’ and until ‘it is demonstrated that there is no adverse effect on the environment and human health’ (Member States’ moratorium declarations quoted in 
Marris, 2000, p. 15), the EU was opposed to their importation, cultivation and use.  
 
The legal status of the agreement constituting the moratorium was de facto. Despite the declarations issued in 1999 on the intentions of the interested Member States to form 
a blocking minority in the Council of Ministers, there are no official documents explaining the background or the workings of the moratorium. Indeed, it is upheld only by an 
informal agreement between Member States not to achieve a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers and Regulatory Committees on Commission proposals to 
authorise new GM crops and foods. Its status was the subject of intense scrutiny during the long debate in the WTO which examined the challenge to it mounted by the USA, 
Canada and Argentina in 2003. Although the WTO challenge accused the EU of maintaining a general moratorium on all new authorisations; a deliberate moratorium on 
specific products; and individual Member State moratoria on GM products enacted through Article 16 of Directive 90/220 and Article 23 of 2001/18 (the so-called ‘safety 
clause’), evidence suggests that it was actually quite a narrow moratorium. This is borne out by the WTO resolution in 2006: that the EU had breached only one sub-article of 
its obligations regarding ‘undue delay’ of product authorisation (WTO, 2006).  
 
The duration of the EU moratorium is also a matter of considerable controversy.  For more than ten years, from June 1999 to March 2010, it has prevented all but a few new 
GM food products from entering the European market and any new GM crops from being produced by European farmers (European Commission, 2009). It is true that in May 
2004, the European Commission authorised the sale of GM sweetcorn Bt11, but although this authorisation was widely purported to have ended the moratorium, the 
application for its cultivation was denied and the stringent labelling rules meant that all tins had to show clearly that the product had been harvested from GM maize plants 
(Europa, 2004). This means that Bt11 gained only food use approval – which several other GM products and ingredients gained during the moratorium (Lieberman and Gray, 
2005, p. 605). Moreover, due to a combination of strict labelling laws, hostile public opinion and supermarket policy, GM sweetcorn is not widely available. It is thus 
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debatable whether the authorisation of Bt11 sweetcorn can really be said to have fully ended the moratorium; if at all, it ended only the moratorium on GM foods, not on GM 
crops. Indeed, until March 2010 only one GM crop has ever been authorised for cultivation in the EU: MON810 maize gained approval in 1998, before the moratorium was 
implemented (Europa, 2010). In March 2010, cultivation approval was issued for GM Amflora Potato (Europa, 2010), for cultivation, industrial and feed use but not for 
human consumption (BBC, 2010). Nevertheless, although no product has yet gained full cultivation, food and feed use approval, it does appear that the moratorium on new 
authorisations of GMOs has finally ended in the sense that the European Commission has broken the deadlock created by the failure of both the Regulatory Committee and 
the Council of Ministers to reach a qualified majority in any decision relating to the authorisation of GM products (Europa, 2010), by deciding in favour of the GM Amflora 
Potato.  
 
The 2010 Amflora authorisation attracted criticism to the Commission, illustrating the differences of opinion on GMOs in the separate EU institutions. Euractiv (2010) report 
MEP Martin Häusling’s reaction as ‘shocked that Health and Consumer Protection Commissioner John Dalli has only needed weeks in his new position to show such flagrant 
support for industry interests ahead of his own portfolio. His decision to authorise the Amflora potato variety flies in the face of the 70% of consumers who are against GM 
food, as well as the anti-GM position of the European Parliament’. 
 
Given the complexities and ambiguities explained above, it is not surprising that the effects of the EU moratorium have been mixed. Its outputs (i.e., mechanisms put in 
place) are either narrow or wide according to the perspectives of the WTO and the USA, respectively. Its outcomes (i.e., behavioural changes made by actors) are relatively 
modest. It has had little effect on the behaviour of most of the parties bound by its terms, because most Member States were largely uninterested in importing GM products 
for cultivation until further trials could be conducted. Indeed, sanctions for violations of GM regulatory policy have been applied only for over-zealous application of the 
moratorium’s terms: Austria, for example, has come under Commission criticism for its continued refusal to grant national approval to EU-authorised products. Finally, the 
impacts of the moratorium (i.e., actual environmental change) have been limited, first, because GM products were never widespread or popular in Europe, and second 
because the moratorium was never complete. Although it has helped to prevent widespread production of biotech crops and a general market release of GM foods in Member 
States, during its existence the EU has seen the continued import and use of previously approved GM crops and foods; the initiation and continuation of nationally-based GM 
field trials; and the authorisation of specific food and feed products using the simplified procedure outlined in the novel foods and feed directive (Lieberman and Gray, 
2008b, p. 42). On the other hand, the EU’s stance generated considerable international publicity which may well have encouraged resistance to GM crops and foods in other 
areas around the world. For instance, there is evidence that some African countries have rejected GM products as a direct result of the EU moratorium (Lieberman and Gray, 
2008a).     
 
The IWC moratorium on commercial whaling  
 
Following centuries of commercial whaling, and many decades of intense pressure culminating in the ‘Whaling Olympics’ during the 1920s and 1930s, the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC) was set up in 1946 to ensure the sustainable continuation of the trade through management of global whale stocks. However, in 1982 a decision 
to set catch limits for commercial whaling to zero was agreed by the ‘necessary three-fourths majority of voting IWC members’ (Holt, 2006, p. 363) thereby implementing 
what has become known as a moratorium. This was an environmental moratorium in that it was designed to conserve whale stocks, and it was triggered by falling stocks and 
uncertainty regarding the science behind previous estimations of numbers: ‘The major reason for the moratorium was scientific uncertainty. The moratorium was adopted in 
order to suspend commercial whaling while addressing problems related to the lack of scientific data on the whale stocks and whale biology’ (Morishita, 2006, p. 803). 
However, as Morishita (2006, p. 803) notes, although the moratorium was triggered by scientific uncertainty, “the Scientific Committee of the IWC had taken the position 
that there was no necessity of prohibiting whaling on all species of whales because some species of whales such as minke were abundant enough to allow limited and 
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controlled whaling” (cf Aron et al., 2000, pp. 179, 180, 182). The Scientific Committee believed stock-based quotas and bans on whaling of particular stocks such the Blue 
Whale were adequate measures by which to manage whaling. So the decision to implement a moratorium on commercial whaling was political rather than scientific, and 
ignored the Scientific Committees’ recommendations. Moreover, ‘As one long serving member of the IWC Scientific Committee, Dr Peter Best, points out, the current 
moratorium continues to exist more in spite of science rather than because of it’ (Heazle, 2004, p. 372). Aron et al. (2000, p. 183) claim that the moratorium was therefore 
illegal: ‘there is no interpretation of the ICRW that legally allows for an end to whaling when credible scientific opinion supports the sustainable use of abundant whale 
resources’.  
 
The perceived need for an international moratorium on whaling indicates the reach of the problem. As Stoett (1997, p. 6) notes, ‘whales are viewed as common property 
resources by regime theorists’ and therefore suffer the economic tragedy of the commons: ‘everyone has an incentive to conserve the commons together, but an incentive 
individually to exploit them’ (Stoett, 1997, p. 6). The issue is therefore global, and the responsibility for whale stocks is not limited to those countries engaged in whaling, but 
to all countries interested in preserving whales for the common good and for future generations.  
 
Many would argue that the covert purpose of the moratorium implemented by the IWC in 1982 was regime change: from sustainable management of whale stocks, to 
preservation of whale populations. Strictly speaking, however, because the possibility exists that catch limits other than zero could be set for some whale stocks, the ban on 
commercial whaling must be considered a moratorium, or a pause, rather than a permanent institutional alteration: the decision was taken only to set a temporary ban until the 
Revised Management Procedure (RMP) could come into being. Paragraph 10e of the IWS Schedule states that:  
 
 Notwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10, catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 
 1985/86 pelagic  seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the 
 Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the 
 establishment of other catch limits (IWC Schedule: Article 10e).  
 
Nevertheless, the moratorium was implemented for radical purposes - to prevent whaling in order to allow the whale stocks time to recover. The status of the IWC 
moratorium is de jure: it is a legally binding commitment for countries who have signed up to the IWC convention, forming part of the Schedule to the IWC. There are, 
however, five legal loopholes through which member countries can continue to carry out whaling. First, the IWC manages aboriginal subsistence whaling which does not fall 
under the auspices of the moratorium agreement. Second, countries can whale under objection; the IWC’s operating procedures allow a member state to ‘object’ to any 
decision which it considers to affect seriously its national interest, provided this is done within 90 days of notification of the decision (IWC, 2008). If this objection is 
successful, the member state can legally opt out of the decision made. In 1982, Norway, Iceland, the USSR and Japan all voted against the moratorium, and each of them 
except Iceland filed an objection (Holt, 2006, p. 363). The USSR did so ‘as a matter of principle’ but nonetheless ceased whaling, while Japan succumbed to ‘political 
pressure’ (Grandy, 2009) by striking a fishing deal with the USA whereby it dropped its objection in return for permits to fish in the ‘US exclusive economic zone’ (Holt, 
2006, p. 364; cf., Iliff, 2008c, p. 523). Norway, however, upheld its objection and retained the right to whale commercially, and in 1993 re-started commercial minke whaling 
(Skaug et al., 2004, p. 870). Third, new members can join the Commission with a reservation to any aspect of it. Iceland left the IWC in 1992 and rejoined in 2002 with a 
reservation to the moratorium after 2006 and can therefore legally engage in commercial whaling (Iliff, 2008c, p. 524). Fourth, members can legally issue special permits for 
scientific research into whales and whaling. Japan carries out a hunt each year under special permit, and although the whale meat reaches the commercial market, this does 
not break the terms of the moratorium. According to members of the IWC Scientific Committee, since 1987, Japan has killed nearly 10,000 whales under its controversial 
scientific whaling programme (Clapham et al., 2007, pp. 314-315). Fifth, small-scale coastal whaling is allowed under certain circumstances, as Aron et al. (2000, p. 181) 
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explain: ‘Small-scale coastal whaling is also carried out under national control by a small number of countries that are not IWC members, or by IWC members for whale 
species not covered by the international whaling treaty’.  
 
With regard to its duration, the moratorium on commercial whaling remains in place today, despite the apparent expectation in Paragraph 10e that a RMP would be put into 
operation after 1990. As Grandy (2009) comments, ‘It states that there would be a comprehensive assessment of the effects of the decision by 1990. I think this was seen as an 
indication that the Commission might consider catch limits other than zero, but there is no sunset clause. It doesn’t say that the moratorium will cease’. In 1992, a highly 
conservative, precautionary RMP was completed by the Scientific Committee and accepted (though not implemented) by the IWC in 1994 as a means of managing 
sustainable levels of harvesting whale stocks (Morishita, 2006, p. 802) But in order to end the moratorium, a Revised Management Scheme (RMS) had to be put in place to 
enforce the RMP, and despite 12 years of negotiation, the process of devising a RMS was abandoned in 2006 because of lack of agreement (Iliffe, 2010b, pp. 462, 466). 
Among many sticking points were demands by anti-whaling countries to prohibit scientific whaling, whaling on the high seas, and international trading in whale products 
(Morishita, 2006, p. 805). This failure ruled out the prospect of an end to the moratorium in the near future: ‘With the collapse of the RMS discussions…it became obvious 
that any lifting of the moratorium is a considerable distance away…Japan’s commissioner…commented that the RMS has been “postponed for ever’” (Iliffe, 2008c, p. 523).      
 
The effect of the IWC moratorium has been considerable. Its output was to put in place binding mechanisms which made it illegal to catch large cetaceans, except in very 
special circumstances. Its outcome was to change the behaviour of several whaling countries; between 1985 and 1988 Spain, Korea, Russia, Brazil and Portugal all ceased 
whaling completely while Japan, Iceland and Norway continued under very restrictive conditions, catching only a small fraction of their previous takes. Whether these 
countries’ behaviour would have changed anyway, independently of the moratorium, is a moot point, however, because between 1945 and 1982, many countries, including 
the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand stopped commercial whaling due to the replacement of whale oil by kerosene, and the drastic decline in stocks. On its 
impact, although it seems generally agreed that the moratorium has drastically reduced (though not eliminated) the catch of whales, controversy rages over whether particular 
stocks have improved or deteriorated since 1986, and whether the moratorium has affected their levels. For Iceland, ‘the issue for the IWC is not how it should deal with 
threatened species, but how it should manage abundant species’ (Iliff, 2010a, p. 362). Morishita (2006, pp. 803, 804) states that  
 
 Many of the whale species have experienced steady recoveries since [the 1970s] and some of them are already abundant enough to be utilised if and when 
 appropriate conservation and management measures are in place to prevent over-harvesting…many whale species, especially minke whales, are abundant or have 
 been recovering after the introduction of the moratorium.  
 
The Japan Whaling Association even claims that ‘the increased whale stocks are actually beginning to threaten mankind’s own fishing stocks’ (JWA, 2004), but this 
contention has been ridiculed by members of the IWC’s Scientific Committee (Clapham et al., 2007, p. 315).  
 
However, whatever the conservation impact of the moratorium, it has had a considerable impact on the IWC itself as an organisation. The IWC was created in 1946 to 
regulate, not ban, commercial whaling and the moratorium has effectively transformed it from a producers’ regulatory authority into a preservation agency. Article X.2 of the 
1946 Convention for International Regulation of Whaling stated that the IWC’s role is to “provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the 
orderly development of the whaling industry” (IWC, 1946). But as Hoel (1998, p. 242) explains, with the influx of non-whaling member states during the 1970s, the IWC 
sharply changed its focus: 
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  ‘As a result of a large number of nations with no whaling interests joining the IWC during the 1970s and early 1980s…the Commission has to a large extent 
 changed the front of its management practices from a conservationist to preservationist and animal rights approaches, a development which is obviously at odds 
 with the letter and spirit of the treaty on which the IWC is based (cf., Iliff, 2008d, p. 1002).  
 
This shift has so deepened the divisions in the IWC membership between the pro-whaling countries and the anti-whaling countries that the viability of the organisation itself 
is at risk. Although the decision to implement a ‘pause’ on commercial whaling was agreed by a three-quarters majority (a particularly high deciding majority for 
international organisations) in 1982, the number of pro-whaling countries today is far higher than one quarter.  Several attempts have been made since 2006, when the 
confrontation between the polarised groups of pro-whaling and anti-whaling members nations reached crisis point (Iliff, 2010a, p. 360), to produce a compromise between the 
opposing parties on the RMS, but all have failed. The latest attempt took place in June 2010 at the IWC’s annual meeting in Agadir, but the 88 Member States failed to come 
to agreement on a compromise that would have legalised restricted whaling in exchange for bringing the hunt under the Commission’s control, i.e. ending the moratorium 
(ENS, 2010). The pro-whaling members now form a group known as ‘Normalisers’ who seek to return the IWC from its current ‘dysfunctionality’ to its original function of 
regulating commercial whaling; while the anti-whaling members now form a group known as ‘Modernisers’ who seek to update the IWC to take account of changing values 
during the last 60 years (Iliffe, 2008a; 2008b). Little room for compromise appears to exist, and because it is ‘difficult to see how either normalization or modernization could 
be achieved; the most likely future…[is] a continuation of the status quo’ (Iliff, 2008a, pp. 337, 338).  
 
Paradoxically, however, according to Iliff (2010a, p. 365) the moratorium is now serving as a glue which holds the IWC together, in the sense that ‘all parties are getting 
pretty much what they want from the current situation...the cost of continuing with the status quo is less than the cost of making a change (cf Iliff, 2008d, p. 1001). So the 
present impasse suits both sides well: ‘The whalers go on whaling under convenient provisions of the Convention, while the anti-whalers maintain the moratorium in spite of 
knowing that it is being circumvented’ (Iliff, 2008a, p. 335); ‘Anti-whalers have a moratorium, and pro-whalers are whaling in spite of it. Both sides…have more to lose than 
to gain from a rewriting of the Convention’ (Iliff, 2008b, p. 404). So there is a mutually beneficial stand-off (Iliff 2008a: 337). For example, it is said that Japan’s priority is 
not to end the moratorium but to continue scientific whaling, because not many Japanese people eat whalemeat, but they consume vast quantities of fish, and if the ‘fish 
supply to Japanese markets is threatened, the Fisheries Agency will be able to use the results of its scientific research on whales to blame the whales, thereby deflecting any 
charge of overfishing’ (Iliff, (2008c, p. 524). As for the anti-whaling community, the continuation of the moratorium is good for the NGOs like Greenpeace, which depend on 
the whaling issue to raise their funds (Morishita, 2006, pp. 805-806).  
 
Comparative analysis   
 
In comparing the EU and IWC cases of moratoria, we divide the comparison into similarities and contrasts. There are eight significant similarities. First, both were framed as 
environmental issues by the member countries of the organisations in which the moratoria are based. Second, both were triggered by highly charged emotive debates in the 
media and among major environmental NGOs, which stimulated considerable public engagement. Third, in both cases, almost all the antagonistic states were developed 
countries. In the case of the GM moratorium, the main pro-GM sentiment was expressed by the USA (the elephant in the room from outside the EU), supported tentatively by 
some EU Member States such as the UK; while the main anti-GM sentiment was led by Austria. In the case of the IWC moratorium, the main pro-whaling sentiment was 
expressed by Japan, Iceland and Norway; while the main anti-whaling sentiment was expressed by the USA, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. Fourth, each moratorium 
was passed by a (qualified) majority of members voting (two thirds in the EU; three quarters in the IWC), rather than by consensus. Fifth, in both cases, the moratorium was 
instigated despite, rather than because of, the scientific advice provided by each organisation’s own Scientific Committee. Sixth, both moratoria allow some behaviour that on 
the face of it seems to contravene their objectives, yet is deemed to be legitimate according to the organisations’ own rules. Seventh, both are ambiguous about their 
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respective end dates: neither has a sunset clause, and the duration of each is ostensibly linked to the conclusion of unspecified scientific testing, but with normative overtones. 
Eighth, in both cases, a pattern of inertia appears to have settled in, normalising the moratoria as the least worst option. 
 
There are six significant contrasts. First, the GM moratorium is a terrestrial environmental measure, whereas the IWC moratorium is a marine environmental measure. 
Second, the GM moratorium is designed to protect human health and the natural environment, whereas the IWC moratorium is designed to save an endangered species. Third, 
the GM moratorium was declared by a body that had environmental powers, whereas the IWC was originally a producers’ regulatory body. Fourth, the EU moratorium was 
introduced to maintain the status quo, whereas the IWC moratorium was established in order to change the status quo. Fifth, the EU moratorium is de facto, whereas the IWC 
moratorium is de jure. Sixth, the EU moratorium did not have much impact on the EU as an organisation (though, arguably, its reputation internationally was damaged by the 
high profile WTO investigation), whereas the IWC moratorium has had a profound impact on the institution of the IWC, turning it from a regulatory body to a preservationist 
regime, a shift which has threatened to destabilise the organisation.    
 
Discussion    
 
What does this comparative analysis of the EU and IWC moratoria tell us about the role of moratoria in international environmental regimes? First, it demonstrates the 
usefulness of the typology we constructed for analysing moratoria. By employing the nine factors of subject matter; trigger; reach; purpose; status; duration; output; outcome; 
and impact, we have been able to provide a clear picture of the place of the moratoria in the two organisations. Second, the comparative analysis shows how moratoria are 
versatile political instruments, used by member states in environmental regimes to break logjams or resolve stand-offs by postponing divisive substantive decisions in favour 
of what appear to be temporary procedural decisions. In other words, moratoria serve to defuse political tension which is often built up by NGOs and the media, demanding 
international action. Indeed, moratoria may be based more on political considerations than scientific evidence: they may even be employed as tools in adversarial 
confrontation, as has occurred between the EU and the United States over the so-called moratorium on GM products. Third, the analysis reveals how moratoria may morph 
from temporary into permanent bans, either because of institutional inertia or because once in place, they are very difficult to dislodge, becoming ‘soft’ law or even ‘hard’ 
law. This means that they may signify a substantive, rather than a procedural, change. Fourth, the analysis indicates that moratoria may perform either conservative or radical 
functions: conservative in preventing a new activity until further investigatory research is undertaken; or radical in stopping an existing activity pending such investigation. 
However, whether conservative or radical, advocates of an environmental moratorium are likely to be motivated by a pro-green objective: we have not found an anti-green 
moratorium. Anti-green actors are more likely to focus on exploiting loopholes in pro-green moratoria, or on marshalling support for the ending of pro-green moratoria. Fifth, 
these loopholes may have to be quite large in order to placate opponents and persuade them not to campaign against the moratorium. Sixth, moratoria subject the 
environmental regime to considerable strain, and the proponents of the moratorium have to carefully weigh up the risk of the regime collapsing under the strain. Seventh, the 
effectiveness of a moratorium may lie less in any tangible environmental improvements that it might seem to produce, than in its rhetorical significance – for example, as a 
beacon or rallying point for like-minded people or countries. In other words, a moratorium’s expressive value may be greater than its instrumental value. Eighth, a 
moratorium may have wider consequences than expected, influencing the behaviour of people and states well beyond its own remit (e.g. the EU moratorium causing African 
countries to refuse GM imports for fear of losing EU markets for their own exports). Ninth, moratoria supporters depend on the power of persuasion for their effectiveness: 
they have no sanctions against recalcitrant states other than to expose them before the bar of world opinion to suffer loss of face (which in the case of whaling can lead to 
consumer boycotts of a country’s fish products iii ), or to withdraw arrangements such as trade preferences (as the USA threatened in upholding the IWC moratorium).  
 
Conclusion 
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In order to improve our understanding of the role of moratoria in international environmental regimes (IERs), this paper has constructed a typology of such moratoria, and 
used that typology to conduct a comparative analysis of the EU and IWC moratoria. The study has found that while the formal role that moratoria play is to buy time in which 
to take stock of a situation by further scientific research, in practice they play a much more complex role in IERs. They are highly politicised instruments, forged in public 
opinion, and often used as tools in adversarial relationships between states. They are sometimes very ambiguous, not only in their expected duration and conditions of 
termination, but also in their application, in that they may leave many loopholes for states to avoid some of their restrictions. They may have a major effect on the behaviour 
of their regime’s member states, though it is often difficult to determine what effect they do have, and sometimes those effects are more rhetorical or symbolic than 
substantive. Moreover, moratoria may reach well beyond their formal remit in the influence they have on states outside their own regimes, and sometimes they may transform 
the regime which spawns them, taking on a life of their own, and resisting attempts to end them. In short, moratoria are intriguingly varied in their character, functions, and 
standing, and they deserve to be studied much more closely than at present.        
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i
 ‘The governments of the following member states…in exercising the powers vested in them regarding the growing and placing on the market of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
- given the need to put in place a tighter more transparent framework, in particular for risk assessment, having regard to the specifics of European ecosystems, monitoring and labelling, 
- given the need to restore public and market confidence, point to the importance of the Commission submitting without delay full draft rules ensuring labelling and traceability of GMOs and 
GMO derived products and state that, pending the adoption of such rules, in accordance with preventive and precautionary principles, they will take steps to have any new authorisations for 
growing and placing on the market suspended’ (Marris, 2000, p. 15) 
 
ii
 ‘Being aware of the increasing public concern about the potential risks to health and environment linked to the release and the placing on the market of GMOs, the above mentioned 
delegations  
- stress the need to implement a more transparent and strict framework concerning critical issues such as risk assessment taking into account the specificity of European ecosystems, monitoring 
and labelling as well as the need to restore the trust of public opinion and of the market.   
- reaffirm their intention to work for a rapid finalisation of the legislative process concerning the proposal for an amendment of Directive 90/220/EEC and invite the European Parliament to join 
the Council and the Commission in their intention so that the legislative process can be rapidly finalised.   
- Against the background, the governments of these Member States, having regard to the precautionary principle set out in Article 174(2) of the Treaty intend: 
- To take a thoroughly precautionary approach in dealing with notifications and authorisations for the placing on the market of GMOs 
- not to authorise the placing on the market of any GMOs until it is demonstrated that there is no adverse effect on the environment and human health, and 
- to the extent legally possible to apply immediately the principles, especially regarding traceability and labelling laid down in the political agreement for a revision of Directive 90/220/EEC 
reached by the Council on 24/25 June 1999’ (Marris, 2000, p. 15) 
 
 
iii
 In January 2009, Einar Gudfinnsson, Iceland’s Fisheries and Agriculture Minister, raised Iceland’s 2009 whale quota by 250 whales: 150 fin whales (for which the quota in 2008 was only 9); 
and 100 minke whales (for which the quota in 2008 was 40), raising fears of “a backlash against Iceland fish products if, as expected, international environmental groups call for a boycott” 
(FishUpdate.com 29/1/09). 
